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Abstract
We study the reaction of more than 60,000 firms to a large unexpected
liquidity shock in Spain during a severe recessionary period. The Spanish central
government repaid in 2012 almost 30bn euros (approximately 3% of GDP) of
arrears that Territorial Administrations had been accumulating for years. We
assess the economic impact of the plan using two alternative estimation
strategies. First, we use a differences-in-differences (DID) approach that exploits
heterogeneity in the size of the liquidity received by firms. Second, we take
advantage of the plan’s plausibly exogenous disbursement implementation and
run a DID procedure using as control group some firms that were paid a year
later. Overall, we find that a governmental liquidity injection during a recession
increases corporate investment significantly: on average firms use 4% of cash
transfers for investment. This effect is stronger for firms with lower default risk
and higher investment opportunities. Firms with higher default risk are more
prone to repay financial debt. On average, firms use 8% of cash transfers to
repay financial debt.
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1 Introduction
In a recession, where should the government inject liquidity to foster investment and
economic growth? To which extent does relaxing firms’ financial constraints increase
investment? Does this relation depend on firms’ growth opportunities, debt maturity,
or market conditions? The goal of this paper is to answer these questions with a clean
causal identification strategy. We exploit a natural experiment that occurred in the
biggest liquidity injection to the corporate sector in Spanish history. In particular, we
evaluate the effectiveness of a liquidity injection program conducted by the Spanish
government through the Fund for Financing Payments to Suppliers (FFPS). The
program was introduced to expand economic activity and to overcome the strong
recession that Spain was suffering. Spain was undergoing a strong credit crunch in
2012 and the government injected almost 30bn euros to alleviate firms’ credit
constraints and stimulate economic growth.
The crisis represented a negative shock to the supply of external finance for firms
and this induced a decline of corporate investment (Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010).
In this setting, it is of great importance to determine the best way to channel liquidity
into the economy to foster investment. Prior research has shown that reduced bank
liquidity causes a reduction of credit supply to firms (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010),
Santos (2010) or Iyer, Peydro´, da Rocha-Lopes, and Schoar (2013)). In an attempt to
alleviate banks’ liquidity constraints, in 2009 the Spanish government created the Fund
for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB), a program designed to bailout and
reconstruct the Spanish financial system. After several bailouts, Spain received almost
39bn euros for bank recapitalization from the European Financial Stability Facility in
2012. Bank recapitalization and the effects of monetary policy have been widely
studied (Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie (2011), or Diamond and Rajan (2011)), and
precautionary hoarding and reluctance of banks to lend during a crisis have been
evidenced. This was the case in Spain, where the credit crunch was especially severe
and despite the large liquidity injection that Spanish banks received, access to finance
was reported as the most pressing problem by almost 30% of the firms interviewed in a
study by the European Central Bank (2014).
It is in this setting that the Spanish government introduced the FFPS program as an
alternative and direct channel of liquidity to firms. Substantial literature has studied the
effect of public spending on the real economy, and in particular on private investment,
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but results are far from being conclusive and have never been focused in recessionary
periods (Barro (1981), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Kim and Nguyen (2014)). The
case of Spain seems an ideal setting to study the potential impact of unorthodox stimulus
policies during a recession when firms experience a serious shortage of credit supply.
We find that the plan was successful in stimulating investment. In particular, we
find strong empirical evidence of a positive and significant relationship between liquidity
and investment, which we claim is evidence of the effectiveness of the plan in alleviating
the financial constrains caused by the credit crunch. Firms dedicated on average 4% of
the cash received (1.1bn euros) to increase long-term investment.1 This effect is stronger
for firms with lower default risk and higher investment opportunities. Firms with higher
default risk and lower investment opportunities are more prone to repay financial debt.
On average, firms use 8% of cash transfers to repay financial debt.
The large unexpected liquidity shock conducted by the Spanish government
(through the FFPS) in 2012 affected over 60,000 firms. In the five years prior to this
shock, Territorial Administrations (both regional and local governments) had been
accumulating arrears owed to suppliers. The volume of arrears was around 30bn euros,
a figure as big as 3% of Spanish GDP. In February and March 2012, two laws were
ratified by Parliament to set up the FFPS. The first appearance in the news of this
measure was in mid-January 2012. All payments to suppliers were done in May/July
2012 through a cash transfer managed by the Spanish Official Credit Institute (ICO).
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that the announcement and occurrence of
the liquidity shock is confined to the short period between January and July 2012.
Therefore, in December 2011 this shock was completely unexpected by any firm, and
by December 2012 all firms had received the cash at least five months before. We use
end of year financial data of the firms and have information from December 2007 up to
December 2013. We use two methodologies, a DID approach that exploits
heterogeneity in the size of the liquidity received by firms and a DID using as control
group some firms that were paid a year later due to the plan’s exogenous disbursement
implementation. For both methodologies we use matching techniques to make the
groups more comparable, although in the second methodology we show that firms are
already very similar on observables.
1Our estimates are relative to a control group, so these numbers must be interpreted as an increase
in investment relative to our control group. This does not necessarily imply a net increase in investment
if the control group reduces investment.
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Suppliers that worked for groups of municipalities (mancomunidades) that
authorities had overlooked in the laws passed in 2012 received the payment of their
arrears a year later. These suppliers were paid in a second phase, together with other
suppliers whose invoices were also not adequately processed in 2012. In total, more
than 7,000 firms (representing arrears amounting to around 1bn euros) were paid in
this second phase in 2013. We use this event as a refinement to contrast our main
findings. We use the firms in phase 2 as our control group and study the impact of the
liquidity shock of 2012 on the firms in phase 1. The advantage of using firms in phase
2 as our control group, is their resemblance in their characteristics to those in phase 1,
and that they receive the shock a year later for exogenous reasons. By using these
firms, we also control for potential endogeneity that arises from the specificities of
firms that work for the public sector. In addition, we conduct our analysis with and
without a matching strategy since the initial resemblance is not perfect and to avoid
any biases originated from omitted variables.
Our study also contributes to the long-standing debate on the impact of firm’s
financial constraints on investment. There has traditionally been broad interest in the
economic and financial literature on how financial frictions affect investment (Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Rauh (2006), Chen and
Chen (2012) or Banerjee and Duflo (2014)). However, there is still no clear evidence on
this relationship. For example, several papers have used data from the repatriation of
foreign earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act to study the impact of changes
in financial constraints on several corporate variables. Using the same data, while
Blouin and Krull (2009) and Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) find no effect on
investment, Faulkender and Petersen (2012) find a positive and significant effect on
corporate investment. In another influential paper, Rauh (2006) tries to identify the
dependence of corporate investment on firm financial constraints. However, his work
has been criticized due to his empirical specification: Rauh (2006) employs a regression
discontinuity design, exploiting sharply nonlinear funding rules for defined benefit
pension plans, and according to Bakke and Whited (2012), his results seem to arise
from the use of a small fraction of the sample observations that have specific
characteristics.
Our paper adds to the existing estimates of the effect of cash flows on investment
through the use of a unique data set and a clean causal identification strategy. Correct
identification of the causal effect of cash flows on investment is a challenge because both
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variables are co-determined in equilibrium. However, the natural experiment allows us
to correctly disentangle the causality of the liquidity injection on investment. Spain is
an ideal laboratory to test this puzzle because of the severe financial constraints that
firms suffered during the Great Recession, as documented by Bentolila, Jansen, Jime´nez,
and Ruano (2013), Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2014) or Bermejo, Campos,
and Abad (2015). Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2014) and Bentolila, Jansen,
Jime´nez, and Ruano (2013) use Spanish data on loan applications and grants from the
Credit Register of the Banco de Espan˜a (CIR) to disentangle the effects of credit supply
and credit demand. Both papers show evidence in favor of a credit supply shock. The
former finds that lower GDP growth caused a reduction in loan granting. They claim that
this is especially relevant for a country like Spain, where most firms are bank dependent
and bank substitution is difficult for constrained firms. The latter finds that the strong
decrease of credit supply in Spain had negative effects on the real economy (they focus
in the labor market effect). Interestingly, the FFPS program was precisely designed to
alleviate firms’ financial constraints, reduce corporate indebtedness, and foster economic
growth. Therefore, it is a unique setting to study the impact of a liquidity shock on
financially constrained firms.
Our data also allows us to determine whether the relation between investment and
financial constraints depends on firms’ characteristics. This has important policy
implications, as government interventions could have different economic impact if they
are channeled to different types of firms. We focus our analysis in the vast literature
that analyzes the relationship between capital structure, growth opportunities and firm
investment. Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that, under certain assumptions, the
capital structure of the firm is irrelevant and that any firm with positive net present
value investment opportunities would obtain funding to undertake them. Subsequently,
many papers have stressed a negative relationship between leverage and investment
when these assumptions do not hold. Myers (1977), for example, shows that with
sufficiently high leverage, profitable projects can go unfunded because of the debt
overhang created by prior debt financing. This effect has been commonly called the
“underinvestment” problem of debt financing and implies that debt reduces the value
of firms with growth opportunities. On the other hand, Jensen (1986)) or Stulz (1990)
highlight the positive aspects of debt on investment, especially for low-growth firms,
since debt can limit managerial discretion over free cash flows and avoid what has been
called the “over-investment” problem. In the same vein, in the literature on cash
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windfalls, Blanchard, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) show that firms do increase
investment when they receive a cash windfall, by investing it in unattractive projects
to avoid having outsiders with claims on this cash. It is clear that debt has a desirable
moderating effect on investment when growth opportunities are low and
“overinvestment” is plausible. However, debt and capital market imperfections can also
have a negative effect on investment when interesting investment opportunities arise.
Our research design allows us to better understand the impact of leverage and growth
opportunities on the sensitivity of investment to liquidity.
Disentangling the effect of leverage and growth opportunities from the causal
relation between liquidity and investment is challenging because liquidity, growth
opportunities, leverage, and cash are jointly co-determined. By exploiting the
unexpectedness of the liquidity shock received by the firms in 2012, and measuring
growth opportunities and leverage prior to the shock, we observe their differential
impact on the sensitivity of investment to liquidity. Moreover, we avoid additional
sources of potential endogeneity that will be discussed later by exploiting the data
from phase 2. In particular, we find that more leveraged firms use the liquidity
received to repay debt, and that the firms that are more likely to invest are those with
lower debt and greater growth opportunities. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) use variation
in a targeted lending program to estimate whether firms are credit constrained.
Contrary to our findings, they state that only constrained firms will use cash to expand
production while unconstrained firms would use it as a substitute for other borrowing.
However, they study firms in a unique industry (manufacturing), in a developing
country (India), and in a setting with very different market conditions. We are aware
that our results are specific for recessionary environments where credit supply shortage
affects the corporate sector.
Our paper is also closely related to papers that study the differential effect of
liquidity risk on short and long-term investment, and their impact on economic growth
along the business cycle. Procyclicality theories argue that in a credit crunch,
constrained firms are more concerned about the liquidity risk of long-term investments
and reduce these investments in favor of more liquid short-term investments.
Long-term investment has higher liquidity risk and thus firms with higher liquidity
constraints are likely to reduce long-term investments. This effect is stronger in
recessions, when liquidity is expected to be scarce. Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette,
and Eymard (2012) show that R&D investment is countercyclical without credit
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constraints, but it becomes procyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints.
In our analysis, we focus on long-term investment. Long-term investment enhances
productivity growth more than short-term investment (Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and
Manova, 2010), it increases long-term economic growth and it is key to recover from a
financial crisis (Garicano and Steinwender, 2014). We find that less indebted firms with
higher growth opportunities exhibit a greater propensity to invest when they receive
the liquidity injection. Our results are in line with those of Garicano and Steinwender
(2014) who introduce a novel measure of credit shocks by observing the change from
long-term investments to short-term investments of financially constrained firms. They
find that firms prefer short-term investments that yield short-term cash flows since they
want to mitigate the risk of being liquidated due to lack of access to cash. Our paper
complements their paper: we empirically show a significant and different reaction of
firms with heterogeneous probabilities of default when credit constraints are alleviated.
We measure whether there is a significant reaction to a liquidity shock and study what
firms actually do with the cash. As documented by Garicano and Steinwender (2014),
reducing long-term investment impedes recovery from the financial crisis and reduces
long-term economic growth. From a policy point of view, our results are key to determine
which firms should the government target with a liquidity injection to increase long-term
investment and foster economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide background
information on the institutional setting in which the shock takes place. Section 3
describes the data used for the analysis and the construction of some relevant
variables. The empirical strategy and summary statistics are shown in Section 4.
Section 5 reports the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting
The Spanish economy suffered a strong credit crunch originated by the financial crisis
that burst in 2008 (Bentolila, Jansen, Jime´nez, and Ruano (2013), Jimenez, Ongena,
Peydro, and Saurina (2014) and Bermejo, Campos, and Abad (2015)). The financial
crisis had a substantive impact on the Spanish private sector, leading to higher
unemployment and depressed domestic demand (Campos and Reggio, 2015). The
public sector was not left unscathed. Spain’s public administrations, particularly at
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the sub-national level, experienced funding problems in the capital markets, just like
local banks, and they also delayed payments to suppliers. The result was that, as of
December 2011, the commercial debt accumulated by regional and local governments
amounted almost to 30bn euros (almost 3% of GDP). This situation was creating a
vicious circle: while mitigating the financial constraints of regional and local
governments, it was augmenting the financial constraints that firms were already
experiencing and hindering their recovery.
Therefore, aiming to address the liquidity problems faced by suppliers of regional
and local governments, the Spanish government set up a new State-owned vehicle, the
FFPS, through two Royal Decrees passed in 2012, February 24 and March 9.
On the asset side, the FFPS made payments directly to the suppliers of regional
and local governments, subrogating itself in their position as claimants against these
territorial administrations. As a result, commercial debt previously held by suppliers
turned into financial debt in the hands of the FFPS. Interestingly, while participation by
the 8,000 Spanish local authorities was mandatory, participation by the 17 regions was
voluntary; and actually 3 of them (Basque Country, Galicia and Navarra) decided not
to participate. Payments were made on three different dates: on May 28, 9.3bn euros
were transferred directly to the suppliers of the 8,000 local governments; on June 25,
17.7bn euros were transferred directly to the suppliers of the 14 participating regions;
and finally, on July 30, 0.3bn euros were transferred to the suppliers of local governments
that had been left behind in the May payment. Overall, in just three bank transfers
made in three different dates within a period of just two months, the ICO (the FFPS’
paying agent) injected an amount of cash worth 27.3bn euros in the real economy.
Importantly, funding provided by the FFPS to the regional and local governments
was guaranteed through the retention of their share of State tax receipts. Funding costs
for regional and local governments equaled the Spanish Treasury’s funding cost plus a
maximum margin of 115 basis points to which a maximum mediation margin of 30 basis
points was also added. These were quite favorable conditions compared to what regional
and local governments could actually get by themselves in the capital markets. In order
to avoid moral hazard, regional and local governments were required to submit a fiscal
adjustment program to the Central Government. While regional and local governments
complying with this requirement enjoyed funding with a maturity of 10 years with a
2-year interest-only grace period, funding provided to regional and local governments
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failing to meet this requirement was deducted from their share of State tax receipts over
a 5-year period.
On the liability side, the FFPS gathered funds from a 30bn euros (maximum up
to 35bn euros) syndicated loan granted by a pool of most of the Spanish banks. Given
the State-owned nature of the FFPS, the syndicated loan was guaranteed by the State,
making it attractive for participating banks. At the same time, however, all FFPS’
liabilities became part of the central Government debt.
2.1 The second phase
In February 2013, another Royal Decree Law was ratified resulting in a new round (phase
2) of the FFPS. It was approved to pay the arrears to the suppliers of certain groups
of municipalities (mancomunidades), a different sub-national entity that authorities had
left behind in the laws passed in 2012, as well as claims which did not qualify in the
2012 payments due to different political reasons. Again, ICO transferred around 1bn
euros to suppliers of regional and local governments.
The important fact for our analysis, is that the reason why some firms participated
in this new phase was a matter of the slack of the laws passed in the first phase (they did
not include mancomunidades) and political issues independent of the characteristics of
the suppliers. In fact, not only were firms in both phases very similar in characteristics,
but many of the suppliers in phase 2 also participated in phase 1. However, we conduct
a matching procedure since we do find that firms that exclusively received funds in phase
2 are smaller from those of phase 1. Importantly, while payments by the FFPS extended
over a 3-year window (2012-14), data exploited was restricted to the first 2 years (2012-
13) since we need a window after the shock to capture the consequences of the liquidity
injection.
Data from regions and municipalities is heterogeneous: this data shows significant
heterogeneity in the payment behavior and financial strength of different regions and
municipalities. This can lead to an endogenous relation of the suppliers that contract
with different administrations, and thus must be taken care of. In our main analysis, we
include geographical fixed effects to account for this heterogeneity, and in some cases we
also control for the financial health of regions and municipalities.
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3 Data and Sample
In this section we describe the data. All our data has annual frequency. Moreover, we
also explain the construction of some variables used for our analysis.
We exploit a data set constructed by the Spanish Official Credit Institute (ICO).
The ICO data set includes anonymous firm information from different phases of the
FFPS and exhaustive firm-level data from the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System
(SABI),2. Initially, in the first phase, the ICO data set includes anonymous information
for firms accounting for 48.2% of all suppliers that benefited from the FFPS (64,879 out
of 134,568) and almost 70% of the funds injected (19bn euros out of 27.3bn euros).3 The
data set includes information on the number and amount of unpaid bills that each firm
has with each regional and local government, the amounts seized by the government
due to unpaid taxes and social contributions and the dates in which the payments took
place. The difference between the amount of unpaid bills and the seized amount equals
the cash the firm effectively receives.
Interestingly, the ICO data set matches the information from the FFPS to SABI, a
database with a coverage of more than 1.25 million firms in Spain. SABI data includes
corporate accounting information, sector, number of employees, cash flow information
and investment information. ICO’s data set does not include information on 46,564
self-employed individuals (34.6% of suppliers and 1.5% of funds), nor on 23,125 firms
(17.2% of suppliers and 29% of funds) that were not available in SABI.
Regarding the data from phase 2, a total of 1.14bn euros were injected to 5,070
firms. The ICO data set includes 1,848 firms, from which 1,201 are firms that already
received funds in phase 1 (total amount of 259mn euros and average bill of 216,000
euros), and 647 are firms that only receive funds in phase 2 (total amount of roughly
80mn euros and average bill of 120,000 euros).
ICO obtained all the credit rating and probability of default data from a special
financial strength indicator module available through SABI and provided by
ModeFinance.4 This data is an assessment of the creditworthiness of a company and it
2SABI data is provided by INFORMA D&B in collaboration with Bureau Van Dijk
3Information on self-employed individuals and firms not covered in SABI (mainly financial firms and
very small companies) is lost.
4ModeFinance is a data vendor that creates and develops a credit risk assessment methodology called
MORE (Multi Objective Rating Evaluation)
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is based on a snapshot of the financial health of the company. These ratings are also
provided on an annual frequency.
We obtain data on aggregate amounts of arrears and accounting information of
counties and regions from the Spanish Ministry of Economy database.
Finally, we obtain from the Spanish Tax Agency the dates of each unpaid invoice.
This information is useful to account for the unexpectedness of the liquidity shock.
In our analysis, we exclude financial firms, which means that a total of 156 firms are
dropped from the FFPS sample. Moreover, we also drop firms that have no information
on total assets.5 We restrict our sample of treated and untreated observations to those
that have observations on all the matching covariates in the four years of our analysis.6
Matching covariates are the same for all our regressions, so the sample is homogenous
and results are comparable. By following this approach, we are aware that we are
creating a survival bias, but we avoid an entry/exit bias whose consequences are far
more unpredictable.
3.1 Our dependent variables: measuring corporate investment
and short-term financial debt
We study the effect of the liquidity shock on investment and short-term financial debt.
Each of these dependent variables is measured in a similar way.
We follow Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2014) and measure corporate
investment as the annual increase in gross fixed assets (gross property, plant and
equipment) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. As noted by Asker, Farre-Mensa,
and Ljungqvist (2014), by using this measure, we are capturing increase in assets due
to both capital expenditures (CAPEX) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Our
study is primarily focused on private firms which usually do not pay their acquisitions
with stocks (due to their reduced size), so this measure seems to be the most
appropriate to accurately measure corporate investment. As mentioned in Section 1,
we focus on long term investment since it enhances productivity growth more than
short-term investment (Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova, 2010), it increases
5This implies that roughly 10.000 additional firms are dropped.
6Matching procedure is described in Section 4.1.
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long-term economic growth and it is key to recover from a financial crisis (Garicano
and Steinwender, 2014). Thus, investment for any firm i is:
Investmentit = (Fixed assetsit − Fixed assetsit−1) ∗ 100/Total Assetsit−1 (1)
In a similar vein, in the case of short-term financial debt, we measure our variable
of interest as the annual difference in short-term financial debt scaled by beginning-of-
year total assets. Again, we multiply by 100 to scale coefficients, in order to interpret
coefficients of regressors in percentage terms.
3.2 Measuring the liquidity shock by firm
All the invoices with different local and regional governments are aggregated at the firm
level. Therefore, we have the total amount of arrears that each firm is paid. Information
on seized amounts by the central government are also reported in our database. Seized
amounts are due to debts that firms had with the central government. These seized
amounts are deducted from the total amount of arrears that are owed to the firm. Our
measure of the liquidity shock is the total amount of arrears minus the total amount
seized by the government. It is therefore a measure of the effective amount of euros
transferred from ICO to the firm. We normalize the size of the liquidity shock by the
firms’ total assets in 2011. We normalize by the value in 2011 since it is the year prior
to the realization of the shock and we don’t want our measure of the liquidity shock to
be affected by the shock itself (which happens in 2012). Thus, the liquidity shock for
any firm i is:
Liquidity shocki = (Total arrearsi − Seized amountsi)/Total Assets in 2011i (2)
3.3 Measuring default risk and investment opportunities
We disentangle the differential effect of default risk and investment opportunities on the
relation between investment and the liquidity shock.
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) find that credit ratings exogenously affect a firm’s
access to financing. Our measures of credit ratings are firm-year probabilities of default.
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These probabilities are ranked from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest probability of
default.7 Moreover, we also proxy credit ratings by computing adjusted Altman Z-scores
and leverage, results are unchanged.8 We divide the sample at the median to classify
firms as having high or low default risk. We use values for 2011 to make sure they
are exogenous to the liquidity shock. Several papers, such as Almeida, Campello, and
Weisbach (2004), Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) or Chang, Dasgupta, Wong,
and Yao (2014) have used credit ratings as proxies for financial constraints.
Traditionally, investment opportunities have been measured using either Tobin’s
q (ratio of the firm’s market value to the book value of its assets) or sales growth.
The majority of the firms in our sample are not traded on the stock exchange. In Spain,
barely 200 firms are traded, so we use sales growth to proxy for investment opportunities.
This measure has been profusely used in the literature, for example by Billett, King,
and Mauer (2007), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), Michaely and Roberts (2012)
or Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2014). For each firm, we calculate the average
sales growth for the two years previous to the shock (2010 and 2011). Subsequently, for
each industry, we divide the sample at the median to classify firms as having high or
low two-year sales growth.
4 Empirical Strategy and Summary Statistics
To analyze the consequences of the liquidity shock on investment and short-term
financial debt, we use two differences-in-differences (DID) testing procedures.
Matching variables, controls, rules to fix outliers and regression techniques are the
same for both DID approaches and both variables of interest. In this way, results are
made comparable.
We exploit the data from the FFPS that describes the repayment of arrears that
Territorial Administrations had been accumulating. Given the specificities of firms
that work for the public sector, it is difficult to decide on an appropriate control group
to analyze the effect of this liquidity shock on investment. To avoid unobserved
heterogeneity generated by these specificities, we restrict our analysis to firms that
7Probabilities of default are provided by ModeFinance, as previously mentioned
8Altman Z-score is measured following Altman (1968).
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participated in the FFPS plan.9 We exploit the heterogeneity in the size of the
liquidity shock and use as treated firms those in the top tercile and as control group
the firms in the lowest tercile. However, we find differences in firm characteristics
among these two groups and therefore follow a matching procedure to control for these
differences. Still, firms in the top tercile have a higher exposure to the public sector
and we are concerned about the potential endogeneity that this can cause. To solve
this, we take advantage of the plan’s plausibly exogenous disbursement implementation
and run another DID procedure using as control group some firms that were paid a
year later. These firms are similar on all observables except in size, we correct this by
matching firms in phase 2 with firms of similar size from phase 1.
4.1 Methodology 1: analyzing the heterogeneity in the size of
the liquidity shock
Our first empirical strategy uses a DID methodology that exploits heterogeneity in the
size of the liquidity injection and the time difference before and after the shock.
To construct the first difference, we separate firms (only firms with government
arrears that participate in the first phase of the FFPS) in three quantiles according to
the size of the liquidity shock they receive.10 The first difference exploits heterogeneity
in the size of the shock that the firms are exposed to. For that purpose, we drop the
firms in the middle quantile in order to better gauge the effect of receiving a big liquidity
shock versus the effect of receiving a smaller liquidity shock. The treated group will be
formed by the firms exposed to the big liquidity shock (top quantile), and the control
group will be composed by the group of firms that receive a smaller liquidity shock
(bottom quantile).
There are significant differences in observables among the treated and control
firms. Since both groups of firms appear to be different on several dimensions, they are
likely to differ along unobservable dimensions too. Including control variables in a
linear regression framework might not adequately control for unobservable
heterogeneity between both quantiles (e.g., Irani and Oesch (2013)). Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) propose propensity score matching as a method to reduce the bias
9In an extended version of this paper we also use firms randomly downloaded from SABI.
10Liquidity shock is scaled by assets in 2011, as noted in section 3.
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originated by the estimation of treatment effects with observational non-random data
sets. In order to achieve objective causal inference, we make use of matching
techniques to try to approximate to randomized trial. To control for the potential
endogeneity that non random data sets can cause, we use a matching approach to
improve the resemblance of firms receiving a high and low liquidity shock.
To avoid endogeneity or spurious correlations it is important that our treated and
control group are similar in all characteristics (observable and unobservable) that can
affect investment (or the variables of interest analyzed in each case). As shown in Table
1, this is not the case. Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of a list of variables
for the top and bottom quantiles (columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 report
the means and standard deviations of the matched groups, both for the treated and
control group. Table 2 develops t-tests to evaluate whether the differences of means for
the unmatched and matched groups are significant. Column 1 reports the differences of
the unmatched groups and column 2 reports the differences of the matched groups.
We adopt nearest-neighbor propensity score matching, each firm in the top tercile
(treated firms) is matched to a unique firm from the bottom tercile (control firms). We
choose a single match and allow for replacement (the same control firm can be used more
than once as a match). We are more concerned on minimizing the bias at the cost of
larger variance, since our sample is sufficiently large to be less concerned about variance
(Abadie and Imbens (2002)). Moreover, to avoid biased coefficients, we set a caliper of
0.01.11 This implies that some treated firms might not be matched if they do not have
a control firm within the caliper chosen. That is the reason why we observe less firms
after the matching is conducted in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.
We match the treated and control group in size (measured by total assets), the
growth rate of sales (proxy for growth opportunities), probabilities of default,
corporate investment12, profitability (measured by EBIT13 to lagged assets) and
industrial classification. We restrict the number of covariates since there exists a
trade-off between the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption and common
support (Black and Smith (2004)). According to Sianesi (2004), we must focus on
covariates that simultaneously affect the treatment status (receiving a high liquidity
shock) and the outcome variable (corporate investment). We have chosen these
11A caliper sets a maximum distance of the propensity score for each treatment and its control.
12Measured as described in Section 3.1.
13Earnings before interest and tax.
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covariates since they have been proven to be determinants of firm investment decisions
and are significantly different among firms in the top and bottom tercile groups. Once
a match is formed, it is kept for the following years. We ensure that all potential
matches have data on all the covariates for the whole sample.14
We conduct the matching prior to the realization of the liquidity shock to make
sure that our matching procedure is exogenous to any effects caused by the shock.
We know that all variables included in the matching model must be unaffected by the
treatment (the liquidity injection of 2012), and thus we carry out the matching by using
the values of the covariates in 2010 and 2011. It is necessary that the treated and
control groups follow parallel trends prior to the realization of the shock. We report the
summary statistics and t-test results of 2011 in the appendix. The fact that our groups
are comparable in 2010 and 2011 is evidence that our matching is robust and correctly
specified.
Finally, the second difference is the time dimension, before and after the liquidity
shock. Since we have yearly information on company financials by the end of the year,
we define the period before the shock as 2010-2011, and the period after the shock as
2012-2013.
This allows us to estimate the differences-in-differences effect of a liquidity shock on
investment: the difference between suppliers that receive a high versus a low liquidity
shock (matched) and the difference between the period before and the period after the
shock.
Our analysis does not only report results using the matched groups. We carry out
baseline regressions to evaluate the data before the matching is done. These regressions
are useful to compare raw results to those that arise from the matched groups and to
better understand the effects of the techniques we apply. Our baseline equation is as
follows:
yit = POST(t≥2012) + σLiquidityShocki × POST(t≥2012) + Firmi + βXit + εit (3)
where yit is our variable of interest (corporate investment or short-term financial debt);
POST(t≥2012) is a dummy variable (structural break) that takes value 1 for 2012 and 2013
14As reported in Section 3, if a firm does not have observations on all the matching covariates in the
four years of our analysis, the firm is dropped and not used to form the matched groups.
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and zero for years 2010 and 2011; LiquidityShocki is a continuous variable that captures
the size of the liquidity shock;15 LiquidityShocki×POST(t≥2012) is an interaction term;
Firmi is a firm fixed effect and Xit is a vector of controls.
Controls are the same in all regressions and include total assets, capital structure
(liabilities to equity), a bankruptcy dummy,16 an interaction between the bankruptcy
dummy and the capital structure variable, sales to lagged assets, return on assets, growth
rate of return on assets, cash, probability of default, growth rate of sales, EBIT to lagged
assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a dummy for the firm’s age.17 All controls
are measured prior to the shock. Lagged values are used for all years except for 2013,
in which the value of 2011 is used.18
We compute an analogous regression in which instead of having a continuous
measure of the liquidity shock, we use two groups (high and low) that will be used in
our main DID methodology. We create a dummy that takes value 1 for the high
liquidity group (top quantile or treated group) and zero for the bottom quantile.
Our main DID methodology is based in the following specification:
yit = POST(t≥2012) + δGrouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) + Firmi + βXit + εit (4)
where POST(year≥2012) is analogous to that of equation (3); Grouphigh{`i∈LH} is an
indicator of whether liquidity ` in firm i belongs to a group of high liquidity recipients
(those in the top tercile); Grouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) is an interaction term and
our variable of interest; Firmi is a firm fixed effect and Xit is the vector of controls.
The coefficient of interest is therefore δ, which indicates whether firms that receive a
higher liquidity shock (top tercile and treated firms), invest more than firms that receive
15It’s construction has been described in Section 3.
16This dummy takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity.
17We construct three age bin classes corresponding to firm’s created after 2005 (young), 1995-2005
(mid), and pre-1995 (old). This dummy is colinear with the firm fixed effect except when the firm
changes age bin.
18Alternative specifications have been used in which no controls are employed or in which controls
are lagged values for all years including 2012. Results are unchanged. If controls from 2012 or 2013 are
used, there is a risk that they are affected by the treatment. We are not interested in the mechanism
in which the liquidity shock affects investment through other variables, so in our main methodology we
avoid including control variables from 2012 or 2013. If post-treatment controls were added, then we
would have to decompose the effect of the treatment to learn what part of the effect of the liquidity
shock on investment goes directly through the shock, and what part affects investment through other
control variables.
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a lower liquidity shock (bottom tercile and control firms) after the realization of the
shock.
Our DID methodology is adjusted to allow for an analysis within groups of default
risk and growth opportunities. Groups are always created by separating firms in the
sample in two quantiles above and below the median.19 These groups are included in
the regressions by interacting the dummies of the groups within our main specification.
As an example, we report how the specification changes when we include default risk:20
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
(ωjPOST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj}
+ γjGrouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj})
+ Firmi + βXit + εit (5)
where all variables are analogous to those in equation (4), except for (PDj{PDi∈PDj}).
(PDlow{PDi∈PDlow}) is equal to one for the firms with default risk below the median and
zero otherwise, and (PDhigh{PDi∈PDhigh}) is equal to one for firms with probabilities of
default above the median and zero otherwise.
The specification is as follows when we interact the groups of default risk and growth
opportunities at the same time:
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
∑
k=Low,High
(ρjkPOST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
+ λjkGrouphigh{`i∈LH} × POST(t≥2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk})
+ Firmi + βXit + εit (6)
where all variables are analogous to those in equation (5), and Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
takes different values according to whether firm k belongs to the group with high or low
growth opportunities.
As commented earlier, the size of the liquidity shock depends on the firm’s
exposure to local/regional governments. Thus, our methodology is exposed to potential
endogeneity due to omitted variables if there are unobserved characteristics related to
the size of the liquidity shock that affect investment (or the corresponding variable of
19Section 3 explains how groups of default risk and growth opportunities are created.
20The specification is analogous for growth opportunities.
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interest) and are not captured by the matching procedure or the controls. A bigger
amount of unpaid arrears might not only be correlated with size, financial constraints
or industrial effects; but also with the “quality” of the governments that a firm works
with or simply with the exposure of the firm to public institutions. We try to control
for this potential endogeneity by including two sets of controls. To control for firms
that work for “lower quality” municipalities (firms that work with municipalities with
a lot of debt and that are worst payers), we construct the following measure per firm:
Quality =
∑n
i=1(weighti × municipalitydebti) where i stands for municipality, n for
the number of municipalities that a firm has unpaid invoices with, weight measures the
percentage weight of unpaid amount in invoices with municipality i respect to all
unpaid invoices, and municipality debt is measured as debt to income of municipality i.
We also include as a control variable the number of municipalities that the firms works
with. Still, it is impossible to assert that our identification strategy is completely clean
of potential endogeneity. We overcome this weakness by taking advantage of a
refinement described in Section 4.2.
4.2 Methodology 2: analizing the heterogeneity in the
disbursement implementation
Our DID methodology described in Section 4.1 is exposed to potential endogeneity
caused by the heterogeneity in the exposure of firms to local and regional authorities.
The ideal experiment would compare firms that have the same exposure to the public
sector. We try to overcome this fragility by exploiting the plan’s plausibly exogenous
disbursement implementation. The specific characteristics of this setting are described
in Section 2.1.
Arrears owed to mancomunidades were paid a year later due to slack of the laws
passed in phase 1. These mancomunidades are not concentrated in specific regions of
Spain, in fact they are spread out and exist in all regional administrations of the country.
Moreover, the industrial distribution of firms that work for mancomunidades is similar
to those that appear in phase 1. Therefore, this second phase can be exploited as a
refinement to measure whether there are significant differences on investment among
the firms that participated in the first phase (received the liquidity shock in mid-2012),
relative to those that participated in the second phase (received the liquidity shock in
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mid-2013). By exploiting this refinement, we control for potential endogeneity that
arises from the specificities of firms that work for the public sector.
However, the drawbacks of this methodology are the amount of firms that
exclusively receive the shock in phase 2 and the time spam after the shock. Since we
use year end corporate data (December), firms only had several months to respond to
the liquidity shock. They receive the money in May-July 2012, and we have financial
data of the firms from December 2012. The information from December 2013 cannot
be used in this analysis: the refinement would not be sufficiently clean since the firms
in the second phase received the liquidity shock in August 2013.
We use firms in phase 1 as our treated firms and firms that only participate in phase
2 as our control group. We drop the firms that appear both in phase 1 and phase 2,
since we want our control firms to participate exclusively in phase 2.21 Firms in phase
1 and 2 are very similar on average, except for size. Since we have many more firms in
the first phase, we match each firm in phase 2 with a peer firm from phase 1 to have
common support, drop outliers, and improve the resemblance of the groups to better
approximate to random trial.
Again, we follow a differences in differences testing procedure. However, in this case
we measure the causal effect on investment for firms receiving the liquidity shock in 2012,
and compare them to firms that do not receive the shock in 2012. Now, both groups
have exposure to the public sector. To this end, we need both groups to be comparable.
Our treated group are those firms in phase 1 that receive the cash in mid-2012. Our
control group are those firms in phase 2 that receive the cash a year later. As reported
in Table 3, both groups of firms appear to be very similar in all dimensions except for
the size of the liquidity shock and total assets. Firms in phase 2 have less exposure to
the public sector, but are bigger on average. As in our DID analysis, to control for the
potential endogeneity that non random data sets can cause, we use a matching approach
to create control-matched groups. We use a somewhat unusual procedure, since we have
only 647 firms that can be used as controls, and more than 60.000 firms that are treated
(firms that receive the shock in phase 1). We use all the firms in phase 2 (controls) and
find a nearest neighbor for each control in the treated sample.
To avoid endogeneity or spurious correlations, it is important that our two groups
21The refinement is not as clean if our control firms receive cash also in phase 1. In this methodology
we are particularly interested in achieving a clean identification.
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are similar in all characteristics (observable and unobservable) that can affect investment
and debt. Table 3 shows means and standard deviations of a list of variables for the two
phases (columns 1 and 2) prior to the shock (2011). We match both groups in the size
of the liquidity shock, firm size (measured by total assets) and industry.
We follow the same criteria as in our main specification and adopt nearest-neighbor
propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Dehejia and Wahba (1999),
Dehejia and Wahba (2002)). Each firm (for each of the two phases) that does not receive
the liquidity shock (belongs to phase 2) is matched to a unique firm from phase 1 that
receives the shock (treated firms). We choose a single match and allow for replacement
(the same treated firm can be used more than once as a match). Once a match is formed,
it is kept for the following year, we ensure that all potential matches have data on all the
covariates for the whole sample (if not the firm is dropped from our sample). The means
and standard deviations of the matched groups are listed in columns 3 and 4 of Table
3. We conduct the matching prior to the realization of the liquidity shock to make sure
that our matching procedure is exogenous to any effects caused by the shock. We know
that all variables included in the matching model must be unaffected by the treatment
(liquidity shock), and thus we carry out the matching in 2011 (the year before the shock
is realized).
Baseline equation:
yit = κPOST(t=2012) + ηPhase1{i∈Ph1} × POST(t=2012) + Firmi + βXit + εit (7)
where Phase1{i∈Ph1} is a dummy variable that takes value one for firms that
participate in phase 1 and zero for firms that participate in phase 2 (this variable can
also take a continuous value, being zero for firms in phase 2 and continuous in the
amount of the shock received by the firm in phase 1); POST(t=2012) is a dummy
variable (structural break) that takes value 1 for 2012 and zero in year 2011;
Phase1{i∈Ph1} × I(t=2012) is an interaction term and Xit is a vector of controls. The
coefficient of interest is η, which indicates the effect on investment of receiving the
liquidity shock in 2012 versus not having received it yet.
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The baseline equation interacted with default risk dummies is:
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
(τjPOST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj}
+ φjPhase1{i∈Ph1} × POST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj}) + Firmi + βXit + εit (8)
where the notation is analogous to equation (7) but now each term is interacted
with the dummies of default risk. (PDLow{PDi∈PDLow}) is equal to one for the firms
with default risk below the median and zero otherwise, and (PDHigh{PDi∈PDHigh}) is
equal to one for firms with probabilities of default above the median and zero otherwise.
In equation (9), we show the specification used when we interact the groups of
default risk and growth opportunities at the same time:
yit =
∑
j=Low,High
∑
k=Low,High
(κjkPOST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
+ µjkPhase1{i∈Ph1} × POST(t=2012) × PDj{PDi∈PDj} ×Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk})
+ Firmi + βXit + εit (9)
where all variables are analogous to those in equation (8), and Growthk{Growthi∈Growthk}
takes different values according to whether firm k belongs to the group with high or low
growth opportunities.
5 Results
Tables 5 and 6 use the specifications, matching techniques and controls described in
Section 4.1. Table 5 reports the effects on investment and Table 6 reports the effects
on short-term financial debt. Both tables follow the same exact structure. Column 1
reports results before the matching is applied, as described in equation (3) of Section
4.1. In column 1 the liquidity shock is continuous in the amount of the liquidity shock
received by the firm. Columns 2 to 5 use the matched data. Column 2 is based in the
specification described in equation (4). Columns 3 and 4 report results from equation (5),
where groups of default risk and growth opportunities are separately and subsequently
interacted with the variables of interest. Finally, column 5 is based in the specification
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in equation (6), where the groups of growth opportunities and default risk are interacted
simultaneously with the variables of interest. Due to space availability and for clarity of
exposition, only the coefficients of interest are reported.
Table 5 reports results on investment. Column 1 confirms that the relation between
investment and the continuous amount of liquidity received by the firm is positive and
significant. This result suggests that 3.5% of cash transfers were devoted to increase
investment.22 Since total cash transfers were around 27bn euros, this implies that this
liquidity injection generated an increase of direct long-term investment of around 0.93bn
euros. However, when the binary specification for the liquidity shock is used (column
2), the significance disappears. This is because all the within group heterogeneity is lost
and both groups in aggregate are not significantly different. In column 3, the average
effect on treated firms is divided into two groups according to their default risk. An
important result arises: the sensitivity of investment to the liquidity shock is positive
and significant for firms with low default risk. For every 100 euros received from the
liquidity shock, firms belonging to the low group of default risk invest on average 0.9
euros more than firms belonging to the high group.23 In column 4 we recognize a positive
response of investment to liquidity when firms have high growth opportunities, however
the coefficient is not significant. In the last column we observe a positive and significant
coefficient for firms with low probabilities of default and high growth opportunities.
Among firms with high growth opportunities, for every 100 euros of cash received from
the liquidity shock, firms that have low probabilities of default invest on average 1.4
euros more than firms with high probabilities of default.24 Among firms with high
default risk, for every 100 euros of cash received from the liquidity shock, firms that
have high growth opportunities invest on average 0.6 euros more than firms with low
growth opportunities.25
In Table 6 we observe a negative relation among the liquidity shock and the growth
22Holding all other variables constant, we can assume this since we control for debt, cash or sales
growth.
23To obtain the differential impact on investment of belonging to low and high groups of default risk,
we subtract the two coefficients of column 3: 0.545-(-0.353)≈ 0.9. Both coefficients are significantly
different. The average liquidity of both groups of default risk is not significantly different.
24We subtract the two coefficients of column 5 for high growth opportunities: 0.760-(-0.599)≈ 1.4.
Both coefficients are significantly different. The average liquidity of these two groups is not significantly
different.
25We subtract the two coefficients of column 5 for high default risk: 0.760-(.157)≈ 0.6. Both
coefficients are significantly different. The average liquidity of both groups of low default risk is not
significantly different.
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of short-term financial debt. Most firms that receive the higher liquidity shock seem to
reduce short-term financial debt more than firms that receive the lower liquidity shock.
This result is significant both for the continuous specification of liquidity (column 1),
as well as for the binary specification (column 2). For every 100 euros of the liquidity
shock received, firms dedicate on average 8.6 euros to reduce short-term financial debt.
In other words, firms dedicate on average 8.6% of cash transfers to repay financial debt.
For every 100 euros, firms in the high tercile of the liquidity shock dedicate 1.3 euros
more to reduce short-term financial debt than firms in the low tercile. Results are
much more significant for short-term debt than for investment. All firms seem to use
the liquidity received to reduce debt. However, there is heterogeneity in the sensitivity
to reduce debt that depends on firm characteristics that are captured by our groups of
default risk and growth opportunities. Firms with higher risk of default and lower growth
opportunities exhibit higher sensitivities to reduce short-term financial debt (columns 3
and 4 respectively). For every 100 euros, firms with higher default risk dedicate 1 euro
more to reduce short-term financial debt than firms with lower default risk.26 Similarly,
for every 100 euros, firms with lower growth opportunities dedicate 0.6 euros more to
reduce short-term debt than firms with higher growth opportunities. In fact, these
results are confirmed in column 5 when these groups are interacted.
Tables 7 and 8 show results using the methodology described in Section 4.2. In this
case, we take advantage of the plan’s plausibly exogenous disbursement implementation.
In Table 7 we show the results for regressions in which the dependent variable is
firm investment, and Table 8 measures the effects of the liquidity shock on short-term
financial debt. Column 1 uses all firms in phase 1 and phase 2, no matching is carried
out, therefore there are many more firms from phase 1. Column 1 shows results for
equation (7), where phase 1 takes a continuous value. It takes value zero for firms in
phase 2, and it is continuous in the amount of the liquidity shock received by the firm
in phase 1. These results are very similar to those obtained in column 1 of Tables 5
and 6 respectively. There are small differences in the size of the coefficients due to the
definition of outliers.27 Column 2 is analogous to column 1 but the liquidity shock is
a binary variable. Column 3 shows results for equation (8). Column 4 reports results
26We subtract the two coefficients of column 3: -1.768-(-0.796)≈ 1. Both coefficients are significantly
different. The average liquidity of both groups is not significantly different.
27In both methodologies, any firm that has missing values for a covariate used for the matching in
the sample period is dropped. Since covariates and sample periods are different in both methodologies,
results are not comparable.
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for the high and low group of growth opportunities. Finally, column 5 interacts both
groups as described in equation (9).
Table 7 corroborates results from Table 5. Firms with lower default risk and
higher growth opportunities are more sensitive to invest once they receive the liquidity
shock. However, although the sign and significance of the coefficients points in the
same direction, the sizes are not comparable. In this section, the control group is made
of firms that have not received any liquidity since they belong to phase 2, in Section
4.1 firms in the control group had received a lower liquidity shock relative to the
treated group. It is therefore expected that the size of the coefficients in this section is
larger than in the previous section for columns 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Table 8 shows that firms with higher default risk are more sensitive to reduce short-
term financial debt. These results are similar to those obtained in Section 4.1. On
average, firms dedicate 14% of cash transfers to reduce short-term financial debt.28 In
column 3 we corroborate that firms with higher default risk exhibit a higher sensitivity
to reduce short-term financial debt once they receive the liquidity shock. Due to the
reduced power problem mentioned, no significance is achieved for the regression with
growth opportunities (column 4). However, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests
that firms with lower growth opportunities seem to reduce more short-term debt.
Power is lost in these regressions relative to those in Section 4.1, since the number
of firms used is much smaller. There is a trade-off between this methodology and the
methodology presented in Section 4.1. In this case, a clean causal identification is
pursued at the cost of using less firms and thus having less power.29 In the analysis in
Section 4.1, full exogeneity cannot be assured. However, results are robust, significance
is strong and power is not an issue since sample size is big enough. By using both
methodologies and obtaining similar results, we prove that our findings are robust and
strong.
28Again, as previously mentioned, there are small differences in the size of the coefficients due to the
definition of outliers.
29Robust standard errors at the firm level are not shown since significance in this analysis is an issue.
25
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the Spanish central government’s decision to make a huge and
direct liquidity injection to credit constrained firms during the banking crisis. The
Spanish economy was undergoing a strong credit crunch in a severe recessionary
environment. Using a unique data set and a clean causal identification strategy we find
a positive and significant response of corporate investment to this unexpected
governmental liquidity injection. This indicates that unorthodox stimulus policies can
reactivate economic growth when the banking industry is not providing sufficient
credit. Our estimates are the joint result of both the supply and demand of liquidity
during the recession. The positive impact of a higher liquidity supply is moderated by
the potential contemporaneous drop in liquidity demand as firms’ investment
opportunities vanish. Still, we find positive and significant reactions of investment to
liquidity.
We also find that the impact of this policy is very different across firms. Our results
show an heterogeneous reaction of firms to the liquidity shock. Firms with lower default
risk and higher growth opportunities are more sensitive to increase investment, whereas
firms with higher default risk, or that are highly leveraged, prefer to repay debt. From
a policy perspective, given that the main objective of the governmental plan was to
increase aggregate investment and to foster economic growth, our results give important
insights on which are the appropriate firms to target with a public liquidity injection:
firms with low default risk and high growth opportunities. It remains to be explored
whether the liquidity injection also affected firms’ labor policies and competitiveness.
Finally, we contribute to the debate on the sensitivity of investment to cash flows.
The positive and significant response of corporate investment to the liquidity injection
is evidence that firms were indeed financially constrained. We further quantify this
sensitivity and find that firms invest on average 4% of the cash received. On the other
hand, 13% of this liquidity is used to repay debt.
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7 Tables
Table 1 Quality of the match for the DID analysis in 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GHLiq=1 GHLiq=0 GHLiq=1 on sup. GHLiq=0 (M)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00
(0.23) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)
Total assets 7136.30 21096.52 8261.16 12299.10
(60799.84) (265236.15) (66259.14) (92927.01)
Employees 68.55 81.73 68.08 69.71
(615.91) (1016.87) (648.18) (600.99)
Probability of default 9.33 9.55 9.45 9.21
(18.10) (17.49) (18.17) (17.03)
ST debt to LT debt 6.27 8.97 6.64 9.59
(37.66) (94.29) (40.68) (103.97)
Investment 0.55 1.21 0.43 0.47
(22.99) (33.51) (21.59) (12.96)
Sales growth 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.01
(5.69) (1.87) (0.94) (0.90)
EBIT to lagged assets 4.17 3.02 3.03 3.02
(18.98) (19.09) (14.73) (11.35)
Altman Z-score 2.23 2.10 2.17 2.12
(1.64) (1.34) (1.60) (1.32)
Cash 519.62 1166.17 592.62 721.72
(6220.09) (24363.40) (6815.17) (9480.60)
Observations 10134 10134 7854 7854
This table reports summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2010 for the sample used
for the DID analysis. Firms are classified as treated firms (column 1) if GHLiq = 1, which
implies that these firms are classified in the top tercile regarding the size of the liquidity shock
received, or as control firms (column 2) if GHliq = 0, which implies they belong to the bottom
tercile. Columns 3 and 4 report summary statistics after the matching is realized. In column 3
we classify treated firms on support and in column 4 all control matched firms. Liquidity shock
(contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section 3.2, total assets and employees
are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are described in Section 3.3, ST debt to
LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term debt (includes debt issued and financial
debt), investment and sales growth are calculated as described in Section 3.1 and Section ??
respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged
total assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in thousands
and includes cash and very liquid assets. Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2 Ttest analysis: differences of means for unmatched
and matched groups in 2010
(1) (2)
Mean differences Mean differences (Matched)
Liquidity shock(contin) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-56.02) (-58.51)
Total assets 13960.2∗∗∗ 4037.9∗∗
(5.16) (3.14)
Employees 13.18 1.635
(1.10) (0.16)
Probability of default 0.215 -0.238
(0.86) (-0.85)
ST debt to LT debt 2.698∗ 2.942
(2.21) (1.93)
Investment 0.665 0.0374
(1.65) (0.13)
Sales growth -0.129∗ -0.0250
(-2.09) (-1.71)
EBIT to lagged assets -1.146∗∗∗ -0.0100
(-4.29) (-0.05)
Altman Z-score -0.128∗∗∗ -0.0446
(-6.11) (-1.91)
Cash 646.6∗ 129.1
(2.52) (0.95)
Observations 20268 15708
This table reports t-test results of firm-year observations in 2010 for the sample
used for the DID analysis. Column 1 of this table analyzes mean differences of
the unmatched sample (columns 1 and 2 of Table 1). Column 2 analyzes mean
differences of the matched sample (columns 3 and 4 of Table 1). Liquidity shock
(contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section 3.2, total assets
and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are described
in Section 3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term
debt (includes debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth
are calculated as described in Section 3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT
lo lagged assets is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged total
assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in
thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets. T-statistics in parentheses.
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001
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Table 3 Quality of the match for phases 1 and 2 in 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Phase2 Phase1 Phase2 on sup. Phase1 (M)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Total assets 26475.91 7823.03 26475.91 27393.65
(198715.89) (89645.75) (198715.89) (226550.85)
Employees 57.97 47.81 57.97 104.09
(432.56) (588.45) (432.56) (720.86)
Probability of default 16.13 13.67 16.13 14.48
(24.28) (21.87) (24.28) (23.14)
ST debt to LT debt 11.40 8.56 11.40 7.34
(91.00) (243.61) (91.00) (45.09)
Investment -0.37 0.05 -0.37 0.45
(10.23) (22.74) (10.23) (13.73)
Sales growth 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.17
(0.73) (29.84) (0.73) (1.90)
EBIT to lagged assets -0.04 0.98 -0.04 0.92
(18.66) (29.32) (18.66) (20.60)
Altman Z-score 1.69 1.95 1.69 1.84
(1.77) (1.80) (1.77) (1.63)
Cash 344.71 500.55 344.71 365.85
(1713.51) (14890.41) (1713.51) (1326.64)
Observations 388 39007 388 388
This table reports summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample
used for the refinement DID analysis. Firms are classified as control firms (column 1)
if they receive the money in phase 2, or as treated firms (column 2) if they belong to
phase 1. Columns 3 and 4 report summary statistics after the matching is realized. In
column 3 we classify control firms on support and column 4 exhibits treated matched
firms. Liquidity shock (contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section
3.2, total assets and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are
described in Section 3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term
debt (includes debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth are calculated
as described in Section 3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets is earnings
before interest and taxes divided by lagged total assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in
Altman (1968), cash is measured in thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets.
Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4 Ttest analysis: differences of means for unmatched
and matched groups in 2011
(1) (2)
Mean differences Mean differences (Matched)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.0274∗∗∗ 0.00186
(6.37) (0.31)
Total assets -18652.9 917.7
(-1.85) (0.06)
Employees -10.16 46.12
(-0.45) (1.04)
Probability of default -2.456∗ -1.646
(-1.98) (-0.97)
ST debt to LT debt -2.837 -4.055
(-0.47) (-0.62)
Investment 0.419 0.828
(0.79) (0.95)
Sales growth 0.166 0.131
(1.06) (1.27)
EBIT to lagged assets 1.012 0.954
(1.06) (0.68)
Altman Z-score 0.256∗∗ 0.150
(2.83) (1.22)
Cash 155.8 21.14
(1.31) (0.19)
Observations 39395 776
This table reports t-test results of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample
used for the DID analysis. Column 1 of this table analyzes mean differences of
the unmatched sample (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3). Column 2 analyzes mean
differences of the matched sample (columns 3 and 4 of Table 3). Liquidity shock
(contin) is the size of the liquidity size as described in Section 3.2, total assets
and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are described
in Section 3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term
debt (includes debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth
are calculated as described in Section 3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT
to lagged assets is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged total
assets, Altman Z-score is measured as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in
thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets. T-statistics in parentheses.
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001.
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Table 5 Effects on Investment (Methodology 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-FC M-GO M-FC-GO
Post -0.902*** -0.716***
(0.144) (0.157)
Post*Liquidity shock(cont) 3.455***
(0.772)
Post*GroupHigh 0.075
(0.227)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low 0.545*
(0.299)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high -0.353
(0.465)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-low -0.078
(0.268)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-high 0.160
(0.468)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-low 0.157
(0.393)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-low -0.241
(0.340)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-high 0.760**
(0.384)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-high -0.599
(1.099)
Observations 47,499 37,742 37,742 37,742 37,742
R-squared 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014
Number of firms 14,510 11,385 11,385 11,385 11,385
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly investment for the period
2010 to 2013. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for years 2012 and 2013. Liquidity
shock (cont) is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011,
GroupHigh or GHLiq is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms in the highest tercile
of the liquidity shock and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are dummy variables
that take value one for the firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities of default and growth
opportunities, respectively. Other controls include total assets, capital structure (liabilities to
equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity),
an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and the capital structure variable, sales to lagged
assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets, cash, probability of default, growth rate
of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a dummy for the firm’s age.
All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values are used for all years except for 2013,
in which the value of 2011 is used. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Within R-squared is
reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the matched-firm level and shown in parentheses.
***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.
35
Table 6 Effects on Short-Term Financial Debt (Methodology 1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-FC M-GO M-FC-GO
Post -0.985*** -0.812***
(0.131) (0.156)
Post*Liquidity shock(cont) -8.608***
(1.635)
Post*GroupHigh -1.303***
(0.252)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low -0.796***
(0.256)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high -1.768***
(0.414)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-low -1.613***
(0.346)
Post*GHLiq*Growth-high -1.035***
(0.365)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-low -0.585
(0.358)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-low -2.290***
(0.514)
Post*GHLiq*PD-low*Growth-high -0.969***
(0.360)
Post*GHLiq*PD-high*Growth-high -1.134*
(0.682)
Observations 44,749 35,577 35,577 35,577 35,577
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.024
Number of firms 13,838 10,859 10,859 10,859 10,859
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly short-term debt for the period
2010 to 2013. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for years 2012 and 2013. Liquidity shock
(cont) is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011, GroupHigh or
GHLiq is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms in the highest tercile of the liquidity shock
and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are dummy variables that take value one for the
firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities of default and growth opportunities, respectively. Other
controls include total assets, capital structure (liabilities to equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy
takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity), an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and
the capital structure variable, sales to lagged assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets,
cash, probability of default, growth rate of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term
debt and a dummy for the firm’s age. All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values are
used for all years except for 2013, in which the value of 2011 is used. All regressions include firm fixed
effects. Within R-squared is reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the matched-firm level and
shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10%
level, respectively.
36
Table 7 Effects on Investment (Methodology 2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-PD M-GO M-PD-GO
Post -0.665*** -0.873
(0.105) (1.150)
Post*Phase1-Liquidity(cont) 3.229***
(1.128)
Post*Phase1 1.538
(1.570)
Post*Phase1*PD-low 4.689*
(2.438)
Post*Phase1*PD-high -0.799
(2.052)
Post*Phase1*Growth-low -1.289
(2.291)
Post*Phase1*Growth-high 4.135*
(2.160)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-low -1.660
(4.163)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-low -1.062
(2.752)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-high 7.876***
(3.028)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-high -0.695
(3.171)
Observations 44,580 879 879 879 879
R-squared 0.008 0.067 0.078 0.076 0.089
Number of firms 25,497 502 502 502 502
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly investment for the period
2011 to 2012. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for 2012. Phase1−Liquidity(cont)
is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011, Phase1
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms that participate in phase 1 and zero for
firms that participate in phase 2, and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are
dummy variables that take value one for the firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities
of default and growth opportunities, respectively. Other controls include total assets, capital
structure (liabilities to equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy takes value 1 when the firm
has negative equity), an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and the capital structure
variable, sales to lagged assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets, cash, probability
of default, growth rate of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a
dummy for the firm’s age. All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values of the
variables are used for all years. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Within R-squared is
reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the matched-firm level and shown in parentheses.
***, ** or * indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8 Effects on Short-Term Financial Debt (Methodology 2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Cont-Liq Match M-PD M-GO M-PD-GO
Post -0.998*** 1.226
(0.145) (1.301)
Post*Phase1-Liquidity(cont) -14.184***
(1.593)
Post*Phase1 -2.208
(1.764)
Post*Phase1*PD-low 0.283
(2.772)
Post*Phase1*PD-high -3.989*
(2.304)
Post*Phase1*Growth-low -3.250
(2.596)
Post*Phase1*Growth-high -1.241
(2.431)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-low -1.231
(4.827)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-low -4.033
(3.105)
Post*Phase1*PD-low*Growth-high 1.012
(3.434)
Post*Phase1*PD-high*Growth-high -3.925
(3.594)
Observations 42,484 840 840 840 840
R-squared 0.060 0.476 0.479 0.477 0.479
Number of firms 24,171 476 476 476 476
This table presents estimates from panel regressions explaining yearly short-term financial debt for
the period 2011 to 2012. Post is a dummy variable that takes value one for 2012. Phase1-Liquidity
(cont) is the size of the liquidity shock received by the firm scaled by total assets in 2011, Phase1
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the firms that participate in phase 1 and zero for firms
that participate in phase 2, and PD-low (PD-high) and Growth-low (Growth-high) are dummy
variables that take value one for the firms in the bottom (top) half of probabilities of default and
growth opportunities, respectively. Other controls include total assets, capital structure (liabilities
to equity), a bankruptcy dummy (this dummy takes value 1 when the firm has negative equity),
an interaction between the bankruptcy dummy and the capital structure variable, sales to lagged
assets, return on assets, growth rate of return on assets, cash, probability of default, growth rate
of sales, EBIT to lagged assets, short-term debt to long-term debt and a dummy for the firm’s
age. All controls are measured prior to the shock, so lagged values of the variables are used for all
years. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Within R-squared is reported. Robust standard
errors clustered at the matched-firm level and shown in parentheses. ***, ** or * indicates that
the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level, respectively.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Alternative methodology: flexible time model
An extended version of this paper makes use of a flexible model with year fixed effects
instead of PRE and POST dummies (Mora and Reggio (2013)). This is useful to compare
whether the two years before and after the shock are significantly different among each
other or can be grouped together. We use 2010 as our baseline year and omit it.
8.2 Random download
We base the download on the CIFs (firm fiscal identification code) of the firms. CIFs
are constructed by 9 characters, first character is a letter that indicates the legal type of
the firm, the following two numbers indicate the region of the headquarters of the firm,
the next five numbers depend on the time when the firm was registered in the Spanish
Official Registry, and the last number is a control digit. To construct the random sample,
we follow the subsequent steps:
1. Download all the CIFs that exist in SABI.
2. Eliminate all the CIFs of firms that participate in the FFPP.
3. Segment the remaining sample according to the legal types of firms.
4. For each legal type, keep all firms whose penultimate number is a one.
5. Calculate the percentage of the different legal types of firms that appear in the
FFPS database.
6. Randomly download from each legal type of firm group as many firms as needed
in order to have similar percentages as those observed for the FFPS database.
7. For some specific types, there are not enough firms of a certain legal type in my
random groups. Our solution is to randomly download other firms whose penultimate
number is not a one.
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8.3 Analysis of the quality of the DID match for 2011
Table 9 Quality of the match for the DID analysis in 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GHLiq=1 GHLiq=0 GHLiq=1 on sup. GHLiq=0 (M)
Liquidity shock(contin) 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00
(0.23) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00)
Total assets 7253.02 21263.17 8427.23 12368.68
(62463.07) (270868.76) (68978.29) (95951.87)
Employees 66.07 82.77 66.25 69.51
(595.45) (1035.55) (632.51) (584.94)
Probability of default 11.97 11.29 11.59 11.46
(20.39) (19.26) (19.96) (19.59)
ST debt to LT debt 5.99 8.76 6.15 9.35
(38.15) (107.28) (39.49) (119.36)
Investment -0.60 0.11 -0.47 -0.35
(9.91) (20.55) (9.90) (11.35)
Sales growth 0.04 0.40 -0.01 0.01
(1.28) (29.13) (0.42) (0.58)
EBIT to lagged assets 1.33 1.60 1.31 1.42
(16.60) (14.23) (14.78) (11.37)
Altman Z-score 2.05 2.02 2.03 2.02
(1.75) (1.34) (1.69) (1.34)
Cash 466.90 1135.99 535.72 686.30
(6593.61) (29271.79) (7380.04) (8752.10)
Observations 10134 10134 7854 7854
This table reports summary statistics of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample used
for the DID analysis. Matching is done in 2010 as described in Section 4.1. Firms are classified
as treated firms (column 1) if GHLiq = 1, which implies that these firms are classified in the
top tercile regarding the size of the liquidity shock received, or as control firms (column 2) if
GHliq = 0, which implies they belong to the bottom tercile. Columns 3 and 4 report summary
statistics after the matching is realized. In column 3 we classify treated firms on support and in
column 4 all control matched firms. Liquidity shock (contin) is the size of the liquidity size as
described in Section 3.2, total assets and employees are measured in thousands, probabilities
of default are described in Section 3.3, ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt
to long-term debt (includes debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth are
calculated as described in Section 3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets is
earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged total assets, Altman Z-score is measured
as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in thousands and includes cash and very liquid assets.
Numbers reported are cross-sectional averages and standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 10 Ttest for the DID analysis in 2011
(1) (2)
Mean differences Mean differences (Matched)
Liquidity shock(contin) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-56.02) (-58.51)
Total assets 14010.2∗∗∗ 3941.4∗∗
(5.07) (2.96)
Employees 16.70 3.256
(1.39) (0.33)
Probability of default -0.679∗ -0.128
(-2.44) (-0.40)
ST debt to LT debt 2.777∗ 3.206
(2.01) (1.86)
Investment 0.717∗∗ 0.123
(3.16) (0.72)
Sales growth 0.364 0.0247∗∗
(1.25) (3.05)
EBIT to lagged assets 0.270 0.110
(1.24) (0.52)
Altman Z-score -0.0344 -0.00704
(-1.57) (-0.29)
Cash 669.1∗ 150.6
(2.18) (1.13)
Observations 20268 15708
This table reports t-test results of firm-year observations in 2011 for the sample
used for the DID analysis. Matching is done in 2010 as described in Section
4.1. Column 1 of this table analyzes mean differences of the unmatched sample
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 1). Column 2 analyzes mean differences of the
matched sample (columns 3 and 4 of Table 9). Liquidity shock (contin) is the
size of the liquidity size as described in Section 3.2, total assets and employees
are measured in thousands, probabilities of default are described in Section 3.3,
ST debt to LT debt is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term debt (includes
debt issued and financial debt), investment and sales growth are calculated
as described in Section 3.1 and Section ?? respectively, EBIT lo lagged assets
is earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged total assets, Altman
Z-score is measured as in Altman (1968), cash is measured in thousands and
includes cash and very liquid assets. T-statistics in parentheses. * p< 0.05, **
p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001
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